Our research

AI that can accelerate research could drive a century of technological progress over just a few years. During such a period, new technological or political developments will raise consequential and hard-to-reverse decisions, in rapid succession. We call these developments grand challenges.

These challenges include new weapons of mass destruction, AI-enabled autocracies, races to grab offworld resources, and digital beings worthy of moral consideration, as well as opportunities to dramatically improve quality of life and collective decision-making.

We argue that these challenges cannot always be delegated to future AI systems, and suggest things we can do today to meaningfully improve our prospects. AGI preparedness is therefore not just about ensuring that advanced AI systems are aligned: we should be preparing, now, for the disorienting range of developments an intelligence explosion would bring.

Once AI systems can design and build even more capable AI systems, we could see an intelligence explosion, where AI capabilities rapidly increase to well past human performance.

The classic intelligence explosion scenario involves a feedback loop where AI improves AI software. But AI could also improve other inputs to AI development. This paper analyses three feedback loops in AI development: software, chip technology, and chip production. These could drive three types of intelligence explosion: a software intelligence explosion driven by software improvements alone; an AI-technology intelligence explosion driven by both software and chip technology improvements; and a full-stack intelligence explosion incorporating all three feedback loops.

Even if a software intelligence explosion never materializes or plateaus quickly, AI-technology and full-stack intelligence explosions remain possible. And, while these would start more gradually, they could accelerate to very fast rates of development. Our analysis suggests that each feedback loop by itself could drive accelerating AI progress, with effective compute potentially increasing by 20-30 orders of magnitude before hitting physical limits—enabling truly dramatic improvements in AI capabilities. The type of intelligence explosion also has implications for the distribution of power: a software intelligence explosion would by default concentrate power within one country or company, while a full-stack intelligence explosion would be spread across many countries and industries.

If there is an international project to build artificial general intelligence (“AGI”), how should it be designed? Existing scholarship has looked to historical models for inspiration, often suggesting the Manhattan Project or CERN as the closest analogues. But AGI is a fundamentally general-purpose technology, and is likely to be used primarily for commercial purposes rather than military or scientific ones.

This report presents an under-discussed alternative: Intelsat, an international organization founded to establish and own the global satellite communications system. We show that Intelsat is proof of concept that a multilateral project to build a commercially and strategically important technology is possible and can achieve intended objectives—providing major benefits to both the US and its allies compared to the US acting alone. We conclude that ‘Intelsat for AGI’ is a valuable complement to existing models of AGI governance.

Humanity is not prepared for the AI-driven challenges we face. But the right AI tools could help us to anticipate and work together to meet these challenges — if they’re available in time. We can and should accelerate these tools.

Key applications include (1) epistemic tools, which improve human judgement; (2) coordination tools, which help diverse groups work identify and work towards shared goals; (3) risk-targeted tools to address specific challenges.

We can accelerate important tools by investing in task-relevant data, lowering adoption barriers, and securing compute for key R&D. While background AI progress limits potential gains, even small speedups could be decisive.

This is a priority area. There is lots to do already, and there will quickly be more. We should get started, and we should plan for a world with abundant cognition.

There have been recent discussions of centralizing western AGI development, for instance through a Manhattan Project for AI. But there has been little analysis of whether centralizing would actually be a good idea. In this piece, we explore the strategic implications of having one project instead of several. We think that it’s very unclear whether centralizing would be good or bad overall. We tentatively guess that centralizing would be bad because it would increase risks from power concentration. We argue that future work should focus on increasing the expected quality of either a centralized or multiple projects, rather than increasing the likelihood of a centralized project.